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Introduction
This essay is not a complaint. It will try to point out the difﬁculties liberty faces in 
the modern age. But I do not forget how lucky modern people are in their liberties. 
Liberty is a complicated notion at any time, and it is not necessarily pessimistic to 
point out its present difﬁculties. Indeed, in large measure liberty‘s present difﬁ-
culties are to do with a problem of manners and morals amongst very free people. 
In the past, liberty often faced greater difﬁculties, and from the threat posed to 
it by vicious states.
Westerners are richer and better educated than we have ever been. We are 
governed by people we elect. Our governing institutions are responsive to our de-
mands. We do not in general fear violence from our fellow citizens or the state. 
We expect to receive impartial judgements from the justice system. And yet we are 
demanding and difﬁcult citizens. We expect to be heard, and to have our demands 
taken seriously, and are perhaps rather indifferent to the competing demands of our 
neighbours. We expect to have a lot of freedom, and are perhaps not very keen on 
our responsibilities. Oddly, many of us do not feel free: we feel, rather, „stressed“, 
even oppressed. We are surprisingly naïve, and perhaps rather „soft“. There is perhaps 
something almost childish about the adults living in the Western world. We are 
demanding, rather petulant, and prone to a sort of victimhood.
Westerners, like many others in the world, are threatened by terrorism, espe-
cially by alienated „Islamists“, and our states respond by reducing the civil liberties 
available to those suspected of such activity, and to the mainstream of society. 
What is more, we are using sophisticated surveillance devices to deal with terro-
rism, organised crime, low-level street violence, trafﬁc violations, welfare fraud 
and computer crime: we are aware of the potential for a realisation at last of an 
Orwellian „1984“ all-seeing state. Are we, as some on the left suggest, sleep-wal-
king toward tyranny?
This paper looks at how these tendencies arise out of and affect the way we 
think and talk about liberty - and suggests how we might do a little better.
I make no great claims for my philosophical abilities. Every thoughtful person 
wonders about liberty, and we all do much the same reading. What I write here 
aims to move arguments on a little from the work of my own heroes, Edmund Burke 
and Isaiah Berlin, but it does so only because it uses their insights to look at very 
modern circumstances.
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Back to basics: The nature of liberty
Most educated people are pretty familiar with the concept of liberty, and they un-
derstand that it is an idea which comes hedged about with contradictions. At the 
very least, it is not a permissive state of affairs. From Locke we hear that the State 
of Nature (supposed to be ideal, for reasons we would be likely to dispute now), 
is a „state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence“.1 Indeed, the moment we think 
about it we realise that generalised licence would be nasty. 
We vaguely understand that liberty is an idea developed from notions of good 
government which were identiﬁed very clearly by the Greeks (who were actually 
not what we think of as liberal as they discussed citizenship).2 We know of Plato 
and Aristotle‘s discussion of justice in the polis, and that it developed slowly and 
haltingly throughout the European world over the intervening centuries. We would 
probably agree that with the European Enlightenment the idea achieved a degree 
of deﬁnition which has not needed much improvement since. We read our Kant, 
Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke and Hume (or at least snippets of their own writing and 
glosses on them3). These German and „English“ thinkers, especially, argued through 
the moral underpinnings of the idea, and at least imagined the kinds of states and 
constitutions which could best enshrine it. In France and America, the idea was 
enshrined in written constitutions. In Britain it was so accepted as an ideal that it 
was widely felt that a written constitution could not enshrine it better than long 
habits developed from medieval understandings.4 (It is rather forgotten how much 
these „unspoken“ English understandings devolved from laws such as the Bill of 
Rights, 1689.5)  In Germany, a monarchical system lasted for rather longer, and li-
berty was less advertised as a social goal, but the rule of law - perhaps the single 
great essential of liberty - was highly-prized and social development kept pace 
with or led north European norms.6 
Liberty as a social condition
It is useful to see liberty as a social condition in which freedoms are not so much 
maximised as optimised. Indeed, society and individuals enjoy liberty because peo-
ple agree to curtail their own freedoms. We do so on a very large scale, as Jeremy 
Bentham would have agreed: he thought the conventional liberal idea of freedom 
was „nonsense upon stilts“7. We are not free to be idle (society insists we try to be 
solvent), and we are not free to be ignorant (society has made education compul-
sory). Arguably, society imposes one enormous unseen tyranny: Post Modernism 
notes that we are enculturated - our very imaginations are indoctrinated.
Isaiah Berlin was perhaps the most interesting writer on the evolution of li-
berty and its practical workings. He draws hugely on other thinkers, but speaks 
beautifully to „modern“ European history, and to our inherited dilemmas. The gre-
at puzzle he sought to resolve was the descent of high-minded 18th, 19th and 20th 
Century revolutions into exactly the tyranny the Greeks would have expected of 
„mass“ rule. Berlin pinned down the danger of idealism. He argued that the cruellest 
societies on earth had originally set out to limit the freedom of the powerful and 
nasty and increase that of the weak (who were presumed to be amiable). To help 
with this set of thoughts, Berlin identiﬁed „negative“ freedoms (the freedom from 
control, for good or ill) and „positive“ freedom (the freedom to achieve one‘s goals). 
He explained: „I wish to be a somebody, not nobody....“.8 States involve themsel-
ves in promoting positive freedoms by seeking to engineer society so that citizens 
are preserved from hunger, tyranny, ignorance and so on. And yet the enterprise 
has often ﬂoundered, and Berlin believed that one could explain these practical 
failings from tendencies in the thinking of many social idealists. He targeted six, 
Helvétius, Rousseau, Fichte, Hegel, Saint-Simon and Maistre : „Although they all 
discussed the problem of human liberty, and all, except perhaps Maistre, claimed 
that they were in favour of it,... it is a peculiar fact that in the end their doctrines 
are inimical to what is normally meant, at any rate, by individual liberty, political 
liberty.“9 He pointed out that societies which contained negative and positive free-
doms could be equally awful. For all that he lauded it, his greatest contribution 
was to argue that freedom is not by itself necessarily a good thing: „Moreover, to 1  Locke, quoted in McClelland, J. S., A History of Western Political Thought, Routledge, 1996
2  Finley, M. A. , The Ancient Greeks, Pelican, 1963
3  Cahn, Steven M., Classics of Western Philosophy, Hackett, 1990
4  Davies, Norman, Europe: A history, Oxford University Press, 1996 (An exceptionally valuable 
account of the evolution of constitutional understandings in Europe.)
5  Greene, Jack, P, in Empire and Identity, in The Oxford History of the British Empire: The 18th 
Century, Ed Marshall, P. J., Oxford University Press, 1998 
6  Sagarra, Eda, An Introduction to Nineteenth Century Germany, Longman, 1980
7  Jeremy Bentham quoted and commented on in Stirk, P. M. R., and Weigall, D, An Introduction 
to Political Ideas, Pinter, 1995
8  Berlin, Isaiah, Two Concepts of Liberty, in his The Proper Study of Mankind: An anthology of 
essays, eds Hardy, H and Hausheer, Pimlico, 1998
9  Berlin, Isaiah, Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six enemies of human liberty,  Chatto & Windus, 
2002
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speak of freedom as an end is much too general“10. A society which prized freedom 
might stress that it had no rationale for limiting the freedom of the nastiest and 
strongest of its members.
Liberty and government
What was the core idea which Westerners at every level in society seemed to un-
derstand and which they wanted to inform the way they were governed? If Berlin 
gives us the most nuanced account of freedom and its conﬂicted nature, the clearest 
sight of the problem came from J S Mill, when he proposed that people should be 
free to do what they liked so long as it did not harm anyone else:  „The only part of 
the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns 
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is as of right, 
absolute.“11 People needed this freedom, he thought, because modern society risked 
imposing the will of an oppressive majority - as opposed to the ancient problem of 
imposition by an oppressive minority. Of course, this is a purist deﬁnition and its 
very purity shows one how useless it is to be simplistic about an idea so human as 
this. We immediately see the big problem: how should anyone gauge the value to 
himself or society of some action, and set it against its potential or actual harm 
to others? Surely, a very great gain to me (or society) by an action of mine ought 
to be worth some inconvenience or worse to someone else.
And we see here the core problem with freedom. It is deﬁnitely not something 
which can be maximised, at least not by the persons who have it. It is a profound 
good, but it is not a good which any individual can seek to endlessly increase for 
himself. In other words, though only persons can have liberty, it is an intensely so-
cial good. Montesquieu wrote: „Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws per-
mit: and if a citizen could do what they forbid, he would be no longer possessed 
of liberty, because all his fellow citizens would have the same power“.12  A society 
could plausibly aim to maximise the amount of liberty the totality of its citizens 
enjoyed, but it could only seek to optimise the amount of liberty any one indivi-
dual enjoyed.
But liberty is not a zero-sum game. We need not be mercantilist about it. It is 
not as though there is a ﬁxed pot of liberty within societies and we are trying to 
share it out equitably. My having more liberty does not depend on your having less. 
At least, things are not precisely like that. And yet it is true that I only have liberty 
because others are not exercising their freedom. The people around me only have 
liberty because I do not press home my own freedoms. „Liberty“ simultaneously 
expresses freedom and constraints.
And here we see one of the enormously interesting problems with liberty. It is a 
slippery and tricky idea which nonetheless must be deﬁned. People make very pas-
sionate claims for their right to exert this or that very detailed liberty, and others 
as vociferously and passionately dispute it. In short, where people cannot agree to 
differ over some rather vaguely deﬁned right to some subtle liberty or other, adju-
dications have to be made. Liberty is at once a very vague and a very precise area 
of operations. Indeed, we need to see that liberty is a word used for very competing 
purposes. On the one hand we use it to equate with something like „my freedom“, or 
„my rights“; and on the other we use it for a very different, contradictory purpose: 
to express the social arrangement whereby the competition between my freedoms 
and rights and those of the rest of society - of society - are resolved. 
Liberty and rights
Liberties and rights are not the same thing. For working purposes, my rights enshrine 
my liberties. Because I have rights, I know what my liberties are and that I am free 
to exert them. The distinction seems to be this: rights are prior to liberties. Because 
I have the right to leave my country (and the state does not have the right to stop 
me), I am at liberty to roam the world. Because I have the right to protest, I am at 
liberty to go to such and such a place and wave a placard. 
It is a very old and difﬁcult question to know what rights are and where they 
come from. The big problem is to know the degree to which they are pre-existing. 
Are they hard-wired into our being? Would they be there in the absence of their 
being recognised and taken seriously? I incline to the view that we maintain a 
necessary ﬁction about rights. They are, if we are brutal about it, invented by so-
cieties, accorded by the powerful, and indeed thoroughly man-made. But we have 
a great need to make them as absolute as we can make anything which is human 
(though of course reserving the right to enhance, improve and over-ride them). And 
of course, much discussion of rights is about protecting them from abuse by the 
powerful. And this ﬁction is necessary to the understanding we have that people 
have rights even in states which do not accord them. That‘s to say: the modern 
10  Berlin, Isaiah, in the introduction to Four Essays On Liberty, included in Liberty, ed Hardy, H, 
Oxford University Press, 2002 
11  J. S. Mill‘s On Liberty quoted and commented on in Stirk, P. M. R., and Weigall, D, An Introduction 
to Political Ideas, Pinter, 1995
12  Montesquieu‘s The Spirit of the laws, quoted and commented on in Stirk, P. M. R., and Weigall, 
D, An Introduction to Political Ideas, Pinter, 1995
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Westerner ﬁnds it hard to conceive, say, that any woman anywhere does not have 
a right to choose her own husband, even if her state and family do not accord her 
that right.
Christianity made rights absolute. For centuries, rights were supposed to ﬂow, if 
at all, from the individual‘s partaking in the divine. „By Natural Right, Locke means 
an entitlement under Natural Law, which is God‘s Law.“13 Made in God‘s image, 
each man had value, and we could best recognise that - give it meaning - by ac-
cording that person rights. In our more mechanistic age, we need a different way 
of enshrining the idea. It must, in the modern age, do something very difﬁcult. It 
must express the idea of something inalienable, and yet manufactured. Rights are 
something humans conceive of and confer, and yet the idea describes something 
which is not negotiable or removable. The most powerful state on earth cannot 
remove from me my rights. At least that is the idea. In fact, it is a deeply ﬂawed 
idea. Rights turn out to be relative, habitual: they shift with time and place. One 
expects of course that rights are fragile and motile in arbitrary societies, where the 
rulers make things up as they go along. The surprise is how ﬂuid rights turn out to 
be in societies which place most emphasis on their being carved in stone.
In the real world, and - oddly one might think - especially in free societies, the 
state is very powerful. Indeed, from Plato on, political discussion is about how to 
preserve liberty from the incursions on it by over-mighty aristocrats and oligarchs. 
Early discussion, it is not perhaps widely-enough realised, was concerned with the 
problem of the tyranny of the populace which crude democracy might introduce. 
This is where Edmund Burke is so important, with his sustained discussion on the 
value of political settlements - especially Britain‘s „compound constitution“ - which 
understands the value of balancing the various sources of power and authority in 
society. (Of course he also stresses that liberty is a „social freedom. It is a state of 
things in which liberty is secured by the equality of restraint....“.14)   
Even a balanced state can produce a total sovereignty of the state which is 
very nearly God-like. Of course, no state could make black into white, just as God 
cannot. But modern representative democracies - and it is hard to imagine a wiser 
system of government - are extraordinarily intrusive. They confer rights and remove 
them on a vast scale every day. One day you can slap your child, the next you can‘t; 
one day people can smoke in a restaurant, the next you can‘t; one day your foetus 
has a right to life, the next it doesn‘t; one day you will be prosecuted for helping 
an elderly relative die, the next you won‘t; one moment a divorced mother is like-
ly to control the destiny of her child, the next the absent father is likely to share 
control. Rights turn out to be bewilderingly ﬂuid. The idea which is most intended 
to enshrine immutability turns out to be very human and ﬂexible. Of course, once 
some new development is enshrined in law and custom, we hope it will bed down 
as real right - part of our legal and social landscape - but we suspect that some 
development will upset everything all over again.
It turns out that rights are not as rooted as we suppose: they are not as depen-
dent on their origins, as we think. They are pulled along, as it were, by our ideas 
of progress. We think, perhaps, that men are now developing into more rounded 
characters: they should be expected and allowed to play a role in childrearing. We 
suppose that we now know too much about smoking to allow it. We sense that 
people are not now prepared to put themselves in the hands of a technocratic me-
dical profession: many of them seek to determine their own time of death.
No wonder there is plenty of work for courts of Human Rights in the modern 
world. It is easy enough to lay out a menu of attractive and obvious rights (liberty, 
life, the pursuit of happiness, for instance). What is much harder is to take this or 
that individual‘s claim to one of them and to measure it against his or her fellow‘s 
competing claim. It is obvious that rights aren‘t absolute, if only because they are 
at war with one another.
It is often said that one only has rights (and the liberties which ﬂow from them) 
because one accepts obligations. In this view, it is the balanced reciprocation of 
rights and obligations which makes society work. I would be crushed if I did not 
have my own social space, and yet only my understanding of the rights of others 
to their social space both limits me and allows others their means of operating. 
Normally, good manners and ordinary sociability mean that we understand these 
things - we live together - pretty convivially. But there is, in good societies, a legal 
framework and a means of imposing it. If we don‘t play nicely together, the police 
and the courts know how to deal with us. 
That is all well and good, but there are many circumstances in which the idea 
that we only have rights because we accept obligations clearly doesn‘t work. It is 
not the real underpinning of the process. Consider this. We take very seriously the 
rights of the weak, the young and the disabled, and we do so precisely because 
they cannot reciprocate. Because the disadvantaged cannot assert their „rights“, 
and cannot repay them, we worry that society must exert itself to make sure they 
13  McClelland, J. S., A History of Western Political Thought, Routledge, 1996
14  Burke quoted in McCue, Edmund Burke and Our Present Discontents, The Claridge Press, 
1997
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have them. So rights are very far from depending on reciprocity, and indeed come 
into play most when reciprocity is at its weakest.
To take another familiar case. We are inclined to think that rights and obligati-
ons are, amongst ordinarily civilised and able people, pretty well balanced. But this 
is less true than we think. We are very inclined to suppose that we have to create 
rather a lot of room for people who are not, we think, very reasonable. We make 
a lot of room in society for people who simply assert that they need a lot of room. 
The drunk, the dissident, the unhappy, the creative: these are all people who often 
cause at the very least a good deal of inconvenience, and yet they are accorded 
more liberty than they perhaps „deserve“ (more, say, than those they inconveni-
ence). Similarly, society treats criminals rather better than criminals treat society. 
Doubtless, there are sometimes reasons of expediency why this is so. We ﬁgure that 
making criminals resentful may make them more dangerous still. We reckon that 
an obscene artist may in some obscure way be doing us good. We understand that 
being a drunk is not an entirely voluntary affair. We understand that protest has 
a long and honourable tradition. Nonetheless, in their various ways, these are all 
people who either do not take their obligations to the rest of society very seriously, 
or do require a good deal of patience from the rest of us as they assert their „right“ 
to take an idiosyncratic view of what their obligations to society are.
This story of progress and democracy is one of increased liberty for persons, 
and yet it produces a very odd paradox. Societies, as they become more free, have 
deﬁned more closely more rights than ever. And as we have done so, we have writ-
ten greater rights for the state and put greater constraints on persons than ever 
before. Put simply, to enshrine the rights of the child, we have asserted the right 
of the state to involve itself in family life, and to police it, much more than would 
have seemed reasonable before. As we expand the rights of the child, we have to 
deﬁne more narrow limits to the rights of parents. As we increase the rights of 
citizens to get information, we have increased the power of regulatory authorities 
- the state - and reduced the freedom of the persons in corporations to act privily. 
I cite these two cases because both seem „progressive“, but both - like increasing 
the rights of non-smokers, or any other development of a „right“ - involve the cur-
tailment of some other person‘s right. Arguably, the more rights we identify, insist 
on, and are given, the more we are diminishing liberty.
Liberty is not about maximising freedom and rights. 
We see an essential dilemma. Rights and liberties are often at loggerheads. Whilst 
we see that rights and obligations are not absolutely linked - they are not a logical 
or moral equation - they must be twinned socially and as a matter of custom. 
Liberty and the modern person
Modern people have ready access to many rights, and sense that society will sup-
port them as they press these demands. They sense in a quite new way that society 
will put right any disadvantage that nature may have heaped on them, whether 
it be stupidity, disability or even a feckless nature. Health, education and welfare 
systems exist to provide what people cannot or will not provide for themselves. 
To that extent, people feel they have a right not to have to achieve well-being for 
themselves. They are at liberty to fail, and yet to be looked after. „It‘s a free coun-
try“ means both that one is free not to exert oneself, and that the rest of society 
is obligated to help. That‘s to say, of course, that I am free to fail, but you are not 
free to ignore my suffering.
That much is a commonplace anxiety of the right-leaning sort of mind: that 
society has created liberties for individuals and by not emphasising their obligations 
has deprived the wider society of liberties and heaped obligations on it.
This is a very reasonable old debate and well worth repeating for each gene-
ration as it comes along.
But I want to try to look at some more distinctly modern issues. Here they 
are:
 1.  We are not all liberals
 2.  Compulsory Liberty
 3.  Moral squalor 
 4.  Having Voice
 5.  Modern Infantilism
 6.  Compulsory Consumption 
 7.  Surveillance
 8.  Terrorism
 9.  The Rights Industry
 10.  Bohemian  Freedoms
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1. We are not all liberals
Some societies favour order, and others favour freedom. This seems obvious enough, 
but bears some inspection. What is more, order comes in contradictory forms. It 
can equate with a lack of street violence (which may be compatible with a state 
which is very violent with transgressors). It can equate with very civilised social 
norms (with severe, not necessarily violent, penalties on the non-conformist). 
Some examples
Singapore, it will generally be accepted, is a pleasant and modern sort of a 
place. It is markedly free of violence. But there is a good deal of formal censorship 
and much more self-censorship by citizens.15 It is an orderly place. Arguably, one 
is far more free in Colombia, where life is much relaxed. But there is a level of vi-
olence in Colombia which is socially crippling. To take another sort of example: in 
France, argument and dissent are tolerated and even prized, but the norms of so-
cial behaviour are very well-established and widely observed. French people pride 
themselves on a sort of obstinacy and on a sense of self-worth. Yet to outsiders, 
they can seem rather convention-bound, and not least with their acceptance of 
state power. In the US, there is at least as much dissent as in France, but there is 
much more freedom and variety in social norms. But in France, there is very little 
„political correctness“ (one is free to be rude about minorities of every sort), whilst 
in the US it is wise to be very careful how one expresses oneself. 
Of course, not everyone in all these societies signs up to all these conventions 
and habits, and they haven‘t all been legislated for. But we have elected to discuss 
(albeit brieﬂy) societies which enviably deploy the rule of law. We are identifying 
some of the different balances peoples seek as they balance order and freedom.
To the surprise of many in the intelligentsia - the media and academia, say - 
modern western societies throw up a surprising desire for order over liberty. From 
CCTV in public places, through the treatment of terrorist suspects or criminals, to 
the introduction of personal identity cards, it is order which the public favours. They 
probably mostly feel that scrutiny, and even the treatment of minorities they per-
ceive to be troublesome, is not likely to be detrimental to their own interests. They 
also probably feel that modern society makes a fetish of the rights of minorities at 
the expense of the rights of the „silent majority“, „ordinary, law-abiding“ people.
2.  Compulsory Belonging
To a remarkable degree, compared with moderns, people in previous generations 
were very much freer but also much more bound by conventions and laws which 
reached into the very heart of their being. Whilst no-one much cared if they took 
enormous risks, and they were indeed obliged to (let‘s say whenever they travelled), 
it is also the case that they were bound by class, community, faith, attitude, place 
and work. One might be, say, a working-class member of a village which was uni-
versally Protestant and bigoted and have scant chance of escaping to, say, a near-
by city in order to become a weaver instead of a farm labourer. Now, all that has 
changed. To an extraordinary degree, modern people are free to make themselves 
up. But it is also to a surprising degree compulsory that one do so. This is both a 
liberating and a challenging prospect. We need to see the degree to which living 
the Enlightenment dream - the promise of autonomous individuality within a 
supportive society - is not easy. It requires that we be more fully human than any 
previous generation. We are free of one sort of exigency - of pain and squalor for 
instance - but have instead another: identity politics.
3. Moral Squalor
Modern societies are inclined to allow a good deal of latitude in the name of free-
dom of speech. Thus, utterance (magazines, plays, speeches, and so on) which is 
offensive to some minority or another is both stoutly defended. Pornographic ma-
gazines, violent TV shows and computer games, strippers, prostitutes, lap-top dan-
cers, atheistic propaganda all thrive, and in ways which are unavoidable even to 
people who ﬁnd them appalling. There is also, to a remarkable degree, a reluctance 
to make moral assertions, at least if they have the quality of also being „judgemen-
tal“. Roughly speaking, society is determined that it is important to support people 
whatever happens to them and whatever they do, and a profound reluctance to 
shame them into different behaviour. 
Arguably, this is part of the reason why some young Muslims are rejecting Western 
liberalism: they equate it with moral squalor. To some extent, they may be right. 
But it may also be the case that they have not realised that Western societies show 
profound strength in their reluctance to impose a „general will“ on individuals. In 
the case of, say, Muslim minorities, it may be useful to remind them that their 
right to reject Western mores is a profound part of the very freedoms they may 
ﬁnd objectionable when used differently by others. There is urgency in this work 
of mutual comprehension: two prominent Dutchmen have been murdered for their 
criticisms of Muslim mores, and these were only the worst cases of conﬂict and 
violence the issue causes.
15  Gan, S, Gomez, J, Johannen, U, Eds, Asian Cyberactivism: Freedom of expression and media 
censorship, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2004
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4.  Having Voice
Modern people do not merely expect to live in societies governed by the rule of 
law, with laws established by representative democracy. They increasingly expect 
that individually or in small groups, their passionately-held views will be heard 
by those who govern them and that their views will have an impact. This is to say 
that people do not merely expect to be free and safe; they expect to be inﬂuen-
tial. Expressed in terms of liberty: they expect to be able to exert their will and 
to curtail other people‘s liberties as they do so. Currently in the UK, for instance, 
there are many campaigns run by or on behalf of victims. Those, whose children 
have been abused, shot, stabbed or run over by drunks; those whose family mem-
bers have been wounded or killed in train crashes; those whose family members 
suffer from any of a number of diseases, all claim a right to have their concerns 
prioritised, usually by curtailing someone else‘s freedoms or by state expenditure 
(which amounts to the same thing). 
It matters here to say that these new pressures all look highly democratic, but 
they are often little more than populist. It might seem melodramatic to assert that 
they threaten democracy, and it is certainly true that democratic governments 
have always had to face pressure from vested interests of one form or another. 
Populist campaigns are just another such pressure. The difﬁculty is that populist 
pressure often seems irresistible: there is an element of special pleading in the ca-
ses it makes. Their arguments are hard to refute, not because they are necessarily 
amazingly strong, but because rebutting them or refuting them is a very hard - a 
politically unattractive option - for governments.
These groups generally assume that they are arguing for the unrecognised 
rights and liberties of their members. It is often noted that they are mutually ex-
clusive or at least competitive. What is less often noted is that rights-seeking may 
not be as psychologically healing or valuable as is often supposed, and in any case 
the upshot of the Rights Industry is a society with more and more restrictive rules 
and state intrusion.
5.  Modern infantilism
Modern people are demanding and petulant in a particular way. The most peculiar 
feature of this is modern bad manners. People demand the rights that we are more 
used to seeing demanded by badly-behaved children. The sort of behaviour we 
see, and which seems to be well-explained by a quite new infantilism, is familiar 
to everyone. It is seen in road rage and in tail-gaiting by motorists. But we see it 
also in a new impatience in many other milieux, from supermarkets to ofﬁces. It is 
prevalent on trains and in cinemas, as we ﬁnd modern adults who behave as badly 
as children. They seem less able than previous generations to curb their impulses 
or their trivial selﬁshness. They expect rapid gratiﬁcation for their whims. 
Like children, we seek to blame others for circumstances which may be our own 
fault, or no-one‘s. Adults have historically developed a certain patience, forbearan-
ce and tolerance, and it could look like passivity and quiescence. Historically, there 
was an understanding that acts of God, or of Nature, or accident, lay behind many 
of our misfortunes. In the modern world, we are more likely to look for a person 
or a profession to sue, prosecute or campaign against. Our default position is not 
that we are at the whim or mercy of circumstance, but that we are central to the 
universe and are its main point. We become surprised and aggrieved when someone 
or some group of people don‘t take us as seriously as we take ourselves.
This picture is very like a picture of childhood and childishness. Carried into 
adulthood, it produces the effect that we assert our own rights very forcefully and 
to that extent put at a discount the liberties of others. Each of us is claiming more 
social space and does so at the expense of others.
6.   Compulsory Consumption
It has been a familiar cry for centuries that people are too involved in the world 
of material as opposed to spiritual matters. At its simplest, this was framed as a 
preoccupation with the World instead as a realisation that Heaven mattered more. 
In the materialist centuries (perhaps the 17th C onwards, in Europe) the argument 
shifted a little, and was expressed in terms of materialist as opposed to ascetic or 
aesthetic matters. The 19th C produced a new sort of argument which suggested 
that industrial society could blind one to the value of the non-material world. It 
produced what would come to be called a „false consciousness“. In effect, the left 
believed, the „cash nexus“ held out the false promise of turning one‘s working time 
into all the goods and services one could desire. But actually, capitalism robbed 
one of nearly everything and in exchange implanted a limitless demand for its 
products. It had robbed one of aspiration as well as one‘s working life. This analy-
sis went beyond saying that capitalism owned one as a producer (that was readily 
assumed on the left): it owned one as a consumer too. What‘s more, by reducing 
life to production and consumption, and co-opting both of those, capitalism had 
taken over the whole of life.
This is nonsense, but it is seductive nonsense. Many people believe it. Those 
young and not-so-young people who go to see the documentary, The Corporation 
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(2003), and read Naomi Klein‘s No Logo16 and many other books, or enjoy the mo-
vies of the Texan ﬁlm-maker Richard Linklater, do believe, with the French thinkers 
Albert Camus, Sartre and Michel Foucault, that modern people are imprisoned in 
lives of slavery to production and consumption. A friend of Linklater‘s characterises 
the modern condition as „being trapped in someone else‘s dream“.
Now here is a paradox. Each side of this argument is rather inclined to think 
the other is in denial. It is as though each side believes the other to have fallen into 
the hands of a cult. The right is inclined to think that the left has been possessed 
by Weber and Marx and their heirs. The left is inclined to think that the right is 
trapped in a sort of Cargo Cult17. 
7. Surveillance
To a degree unimaginable in previous generations, everything we do and say is 
watched and is capable of being stored and noted. Our movements in public are 
often recorded. A note of our DNA is already often stored, and this could easily 
be systematised. Our ﬁnancial, education, health, employment and leisure details 
are already all tracked to some degree, and this could easily be systematised. We 
readily assume that anything we write, or publish, and often any image we handle, 
will be computerised and thus capable of being tracked and stored.
It‘s interesting the degree to which these facts are already in place: we know 
the degree to which these things have already happened. And most of us seem 
hardly to mind at all. Presumably, if the systems are enhanced and made more in-
trusive, permanent and obligatory, there will be a debate. There may come a point 
at which there is a sudden revolt. But what seems more remarkable is the degree 
to which the majority of people - for good or ill - seem not merely unconcerned 
about, but positively to welcome, the degree to which the authorities can know 
about their lives. 
Their reasoning seems to be that they are completely innocent and the more 
surveillance there is the more their innocence will be obvious. And they seem to 
believe a corollary: that surveillance will make it more likely that one can separa-
te the criminal and the terrorist from the innocent. Several problems may arise of 
course. One is that the state or someone else may put the data to mischievous use. 
Or the state or someone else may identify the deviant and the dissident as criminal. 
Or the state or someone else may come to regard the criminal or the terrorist as 
being unworthy of the sort of civil respect accorded to the innocent.
These problems make it clear how important it will be that the state is highly 
accountable, and that - since we seem to be increasing its power - we are doubly 
alert to its potential to do harm. Oddly, society does have a weapon against the 
accumulation of information in the state‘s hands. This is to assert its indifference 
to much of the information. That‘s to say: being poor, or a bankrupt, or homose-
xual, or a vociferous dissident, or disabled, or many of the other things which have 
been a matter of shame or risk in previous generations have already become, and 
can increasingly be, seen as perfectly normal. 
This is a little like the matter of blackmail. One way of getting rid of blackmail 
is to catch and punish blackmailers. The other is to make the information they 
possess worthless by making it clear that they know nothing which can harm their 
intended victim‘s reputation. 
8.  Terrorism
It may seem odd that I say rather little about this large threat to our liberties. Or 
would you prefer that I apologise for saying rather little about the threat to our 
liberties posed by the state‘s response to terrorism?
It is clear that states rather enjoy emergencies: these are periods when the 
authorities come into their own. They use the full range of their powers, and can 
extend them. The so-called „war“ against global terrorism has indeed produced le-
gislation around the world, and most of it increases authority and reduces the civil 
rights of minorities and even majorities in many countries. Obviously, we need to 
be vigilant that these new powers are proportionate to the present risk, and that 
they are dismantled when the risk diminishes. 
But all that is obvious and is well-discussed and contested. Still, it may be 
worth repeating that modern society does face the problem of extreme and violent 
„Islamism“ (for want of a better word). Societies have to judge the degree to which 
reducing the civil rights of suspected terrorists is valuable in combating them, and 
balance that against the increase in terrorism that any abuse may also engender. 
I put it that way because it may be that consideration of the expediency of anti-
terrorist measures is a better lever against excess than moral considerations alone 
would be. And in the meantime, it is also worth stressing that democratic govern-
ments could face a very severe - and even a morally justiﬁed - backlash if their 
scruples over civil rights did indeed lead to terrorist outrages.
16  Klein, Naomi, No Logo, Flamingo, 2000
17  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cargo_cult
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In short, the terrorists have a great power to trample on the liberties of their 
target societies, and it may be worth sacriﬁcing some of our liberty - and some of 
the suspected or actual terrorists‘ - liberties to reduce the risk.
9.  The Rights Industry
Much more than has ever been the case, there is now a professional „rights in-
dustry“. The rights of criminals, prisoners, pensioners, drug addicts, victims of 
accidents, children, the old, patients, divorced fathers, rape victims, victims of 
crime are all vociferously and vigorously pursued by quite well-funded professio-
nal campaigners (who are often seeking „voice“ having been victims themselves). 
Some of these campaigns cast as „villains“ the very people other campaigns cast 
as victims. (Women‘s groups argue that absentee fathers do not deserve the rights 
that fathers‘ groups claim.)
The professionalism of many of these groups panders to a modern, false sen-
se that political activity is a poor way to balance the competing claims of people 
seeking rights. The merit of politics is that it is conducted by people who represent 
large constituencies and wide interests. Within each representative are the sorts of 
conﬂicts which make decent balances of rights more likely to be understood; within 
the democratic process they are all but guaranteed. Indeed, the modern problem 
is that the shrillness or glamorousness of this or that professional campaign will 
dominate and overwhelm the making of laws within democracies.
10. Bohemian Freedoms
Bohemianism has been a recognisable feature of Western societies for hundreds of 
years (and is a feature in various forms of other societies, perhaps most obviously 
in Japan18). It is a way of life which at its heart asserts the rights of some people 
to live with greater freedom than their neighbours.19 It is a way of life which ex-
plicitly rejects the norms of conventional life. Bohemians claim the right not to 
be providential about money: they do not seek to accumulate it, even though the 
rest of society recognises that being able to look after one self ﬁnancially is a core 
social obligation. Bohemians claim the right to sexual and child-rearing habits 
which conventional society regards as immoral and irresponsible. Bohemians claim 
that artistic endeavour is the highest form of activity. Bohemians generally claim 
that conventional authority, militarism and justice systems are all deeply ﬂawed. 
The general Bohemian assumption is that conventional society is materialist, and 
that its mores are skewed to satisfy the orderly production of soulless, industria-
lised and institutionalised goods and services. One might say that Bohemianism is 
essentially libertarian.
What is interesting is that Bohemianism is becoming a quaint matter for his-
torical study. But at the same time, it is arguably becoming the default value of 
Western society. True, most of us do continue to pay our taxes and worry about 
saving money. And it is often said that modern Westerners are too materialist. But 
it also seems fair to argue that in many of our habits - our attitude to authority, to 
sexual and familial norms, to creativity, even to medicine - more and more people 
claim the freedoms common in  that other-worldly place, Bohemia. 
The trend is identiﬁable perhaps from the 1960s, when for the ﬁrst time a mass 
movement of young people identiﬁed itself as, well, Bohemian. What is interesting 
to note is that Bohemia was deeply dysfunctional. It produced chaotic families, 
alcoholism, indifferent art and bankruptcy. To fetishise Bohemia is to understate 
the value of representative democracy, deference, order and solvency.
Conclusion
The Big Idea of this paper is to remind ourselves that liberty - right and freedoms 
- ﬂows from good government and order; oddly, it ﬂows from disciplined citizens. 
It ﬂows from responsible, thoughtful adults who understand that life is not best 
modelled on a child‘s playroom or a hippy commune. Modern people have more 
freedom than any in history, but perhaps understand it rather less. They may even 
not value liberty as they should: as something shared and created by people and 
institutions. One does not create more liberty in society always by claiming more 
freedom for oneself. We have perhaps come to the end of a particular period in 
the ceaseless ﬂux of fashion in human affairs. We have trivially celebrated selﬁs-
hness and bad manners as though there were an expression of freedom. It may be 
time now to take a more traditional view of liberty: one which values very highly 
the freedom of others.
18  Carey,Peter, Wrong About Japan, Faber and Faber, 2005
19  Wilson, Elizabeth, Bohemians: The glamorous outcasts, Taurisparke, 2003
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